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Transactions Cost Theory influence in strategy research: A review 
through a bibliometric study in leading journals 
 
ABSTRACT 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) is widely used in several management 
disciplines. Its value for explaining organizational phenomena and 
managers’ decisions is well accepted and has been recognized with two 
Nobel laureates (Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson). In this paper we 
examine the impact of the TCT on extant research in top tier management 
journals. We conduct a bibliometric study supported in the analysis of 
citations and co-citations to uncover the connections between authors and 
presumably theories. We conclude that the TCT, albeit its specific focus on 
the transactions as the unit of analysis, is present in a majority of 
management- and business-related research. 
 
Keywords: transaction costs theory, bibliometric study, strategy research, 
review 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent Nobel prize award in Economics to Oliver Williamson, in 2009, 
recognizes the importance of Transaction Costs Economics Theory (TCT) 
namely for the “… analysis of economic governance, especially the 
boundaries of the firm" (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2009). It 
reinforced the impact of the Nobel award in Economics, in 1991, given to 
Ronald Coase’s (1937) (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2009) for his 
work on the nature of the firm that is considered as seminal work for the 
TCT. 
Transaction cost theory (TCT), or transaction cost economics (TCE), 
has become an increasingly important anchor for the analysis of a wide 
range of strategic and organizational issues of considerable importance to 
firms (Williamson, 1994; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Williamson, 1996; Jones, 
1998; Madhok, 2002). In particular, the TCT has been employed in studying 
firms’ boundaries, vertical integration decisions, the rationale for conducting 
an acquisition, the networks and other hybrid governance forms. The TCT 
has expanded its breath to strategic management and international 
business in seeking to explain how firms internationalize and the structural 
arrangements required to improve the odds of success. In fact, it is 
reasonable to put forward that the TCT has become a pervasive theory in 
organizational studies.  
In this article we analyze the Transaction Cost Theory’s influence in the 
academic research in strategic management, by noting its use in extant 
published research. Specifically, we examine the theoretical contribution 
and the most influential authors by performing a bibliometric study of the 
TCT in the following selected top tier academic journals: Academy of 
Management Journal (AMJ), Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ), 
Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), Management Science (MS), 
Organization Science (OS) and Strategic Management Journal (SMJ). We 
thus seek to better understand the intellectual structure that connects 
theories and authors (White & McCain, 1998; Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-
Navarro, 2004). 
This article is structured as follows. First, we review the most 
important issues and assumptions of the TCT.  Then, we discuss the 
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evolution of TCT. In the third part, we present the method, sample and 
procedure for data collection. This section is followed by the results and 
analysis. We conclude comparing and contrasting TCT with other theories 
and suggesting additional future research avenues. 
 
IMPORTANT ISSUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN TRANSACTIONS COST 
THEORY  
Transaction Costs Economics is part of the New Institutional Economics 
research tradition. The main focus of TCE is the definition of the 
determinants of coordination of the transactions through markets or 
hierarchies (Joskow, 1988). In this sense, the boundaries of the firm should 
be a function of the governance structure (Holmström & Roberts, 1998; 
Williamson, 2002, 2005), especially when we consider that this governance 
structure would assure the optimal adaptability of the firm to changes in the 
conditions of supply and demand. One important aspect of TCE is that it 
focus not only on the two extremes of transaction governance (that is, 
hierarchy vs. market), but also on other hybrid forms and long term 
contracts. 
The main research question that transaction cost theory (TCT) seeks to 
address is why economic transactions are organized in the way that they 
are in the modern society (Williamson, 1994). Specifically, why are some 
economic transactions internalized within the boundaries of firms while 
others are procured to external parties? Stated more simply: why do firms 
do what they do? Or, as recently exposed by Madhok (2002) why don't 
firms do what they don't? The general conclusion is that activities are 
internalized inside the firm when there is some form of market failure, and 
most notably market failure of intermediate inputs. TCT argues that there 
are costs to conduct transactions through the market; these transaction 
costs can be reduced through mechanisms other than markets (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1975). Specifically there are costs to “drafting, 
negotiating, and safeguarding any exchange or transaction” that are 
“friction” impeding smooth transactions (Williamson, 1985: 20). TCT claims 
that these transaction costs driving economic organization are as important 
as production costs, or perhaps even more important. While production 
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costs are easier to assess than transaction costs, transaction costs are an 
important part of the total costs of a firm. Transactions costs comprise the 
ex-ante costs of (1) searching and information, (2) drafting and negotiating 
na agreement, and (3) costs of safeguarding the agreement. The ex-post 
costs entail the costs of (1) evaluating the input, (2) measuring the output, 
and (3) monitoring and enforcement (Williamson, 1985). 
TCT emerges from the relative failure of neoclassical economic theory 
to adequately address and explain economic phenomena. Centered on the 
perfect competition paradigm, the neoclassical view of the firm as a 
production function is often criticized as being reductionistic, simplistic, and 
unrealistic. The organization we call the firm “was a black box. Into this box 
went labor and capital, and out came products” (Alchian & Woodward, 
1988: 65). Efficiency in neoclassical view is measured by the input to output 
ratio. Researchers of TCT (in particular the new institutional economics) 
opened up the “black box” to further examine how it actually operates. In 
contrast to the neoclassical view, TCT considers the firm as a hierarchy that 
adds value by economizing on transaction costs. Efficiency in TCT is 
conceptualized as pareto efficiency where governance modes are compared 
according to their ability to facilitate transactions until the point at which it 
is impossible to make one party better off without making the other party 
worse off (Jones, 1998).  TCT claims that the firm, in many cases, provides 
a relatively more efficient method of organizing relative to the market 
because of optimization of transaction costs or overall value. Therefore, TCT 
is about efficiency and views economic organization as being principally 
concerned with the relative efficiency of optimizing on transaction costs. 
TCE poses the problem of economic organization as a problem of 
contracting (Williamson, 1985: 20). 
Assumptions of TCT 
TCT rests upon several key assumptions about human behavior and 
environmental characteristics (Williamson, 1979; Williamson & Ouchi, 1981; 
Williamson, 1985). These assumptions elucidate why firms may face 
superior costs for market-based transactions and why firms may be 
relatively more efficient than markets at organizing transactions. The firm 
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will select the governance form, from the various alternatives amongst the 
organizational menu, that minimizes transaction and production costs. 
Assumptions about human and human behavior 
Opportunism with guile. In neoclassical economics, humans are viewed 
as self-interested; individuals pursue their own self-interest in their own 
activities (i.e., simple self-interest according to Williamson (1985)). 
Opportunism with guile takes this assumption a step further to assume that 
individuals may engage in behavior that is both subtly and overtly deceitful 
ex ante and ex post to agreeing on contracts. As Williamson (1985: 48) 
puts it “Plainly, were it not for opportunism, all behavior could be rule 
governed”. In fact, it is precisely because sometimes some individuals 
behave opportunistically that there are costs to exchange (e.g., contracts 
can not be written and enforced perfectly or costlessly). The opportunism 
assumption is about the motivations of human behavior (Williamson, 1985). 
This assumption is central to TCT because, in the absence of potentially 
opportunistic behaviors, contracts would be costlessly enforced and there 
would be no reason for other forms of economic organization besides the 
market. 
Bounded rationality. The neoclassical theory assumes that individuals 
have perfect information and act as utility maximizers with calculative 
rationality. In sharp contrast, the TCT views human as boundedly rational - 
individuals are “intendedlly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1961 as 
cited in Williamson, 1985). Bounded rationality reflects individuals’ inability 
to process large degrees of information and their difficulty in assigning 
probability values to the occurrence of future events. It is worth noting that 
bounded rationality does not imply that individuals seek to be irrational. In 
fact, they seek to make rational decisions but within the limits of their 
imperfect cognitive abilities and in conditions of imperfect information. 
Assumptions about environmental characteristics 
Asset specificity. Williamson defined asset specificity as “durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the 
opportunity cost of which investment is much lower in best alternative uses 
or by alternative users should be original transaction be prematurely 
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terminated” (1985: 55). In contrast to the neoclassical economics which 
treats exchanges of standard nature, transactions according to TCT often 
involve idiosyncratic attributes so that contracts cannot be written costlessly 
due to, for example, the unknown idiosyncrasies beforehand. In this respect 
Williamson (1985: 53) states that “[transactions that are supported by 
investments in durable, transaction-specific assets experience ‘lock in’ 
effects, on which account autonomous trading will commonly be supplanted 
by unified ownership”. Hence contractual and organizational safeguards 
(i.e., firms) become necessary for transactions involving these nonstandard 
assets.  
Transaction costs theory focuses rather strongly the asset specificity 
and its role in determining how to better organize exchanges. The broad 
advice is that when assets are not specific to an exchange the market may 
be the most efficient way (or the best way for minimizing costs) to organize 
it. The asset specificity makes specific reference to the extent to which an 
asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and/or by alternative users 
without a substantial sacrifice of its productive value (Williamson, 1989: 
141). And, it is possible to distinguish six different types of asset specificity: 
site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, dedicated 
assets, brand name capital and temporal specificity (Williamson, 1989: 141-
142). The degree of asset specificity ranges from nonspecific to mixed to 
idiosyncratic (Williamson, 1979, 1985). The asset specificity assumption 
might be called the locomotive or driving assumption of TCT as Williamson 
himself states “the importance of asset specificity to transaction cost 
economics is difficult to exaggerate” (1985: 56). 
Uncertainty. Uncertainty is a straightforward assumption and it 
contrasts with the perfect-information assumption of the neoclassical view. 
Information about past, current and future states is not perfectly known, for 
various reasons. Without the existence of bounded rationality and 
opportunism, uncertainty would be much less of a problem because general 
rules would generally prevail (Williamson, 1985). However, given these 
assumptions uncertainty is especially critical. Uncertainty arises from, for 
example, not knowing about future states or/and the inability to determine 
who is more prone to behave opportunistically (Williamson, 1993b). 
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Because it is very difficult to determine ex ante who will engage in 
opportunistic behavior, contracts are not costlessly written and enforced 
(Williamson, 1993b).  
Frequency of the transactions. If transactions are infrequent then the 
costs of alternative governance structures may not be justified. A larger 
frequency or larger volumes of transactions, however, gives rise to 
justification for alternative governance structures such as the firm. 
Therefore the volume, number, and/or temporal spread of transactions are 
important to be considered because even given the previous assumptions if 
they are infrequent alternative governance structures may not be necessary 
or feasible. The degree of frequency ranges from occasional to recurrent 
(Williamson, 1979, 1985).  
In sum, Williamson (1975) identified three determinants of the 
transaction costs: (a) the agents’ bounded rationality, that originates 
incomplete contracts due to the impossibility of foreseeing, in the 
contracting moment, all future situations; (b) opportunism that is originated 
when one of the partners pursues his own short-term self-interest; and (c) 
the assets specificity, this originates that the owners of production factors 
will incur costs if they deviate the assets to another use, and leads to the 
conclusion that the best use is improved by internalization. Internalization 
will be preferred to externalization if three conditions are verified:  (A) The 
degree of the transaction uncertainty is high - that is, if it’s difficult to 
guarantee the execution of the contract - the supplier may have an 
opportunistic behavior that impairs the customers;  (B) If the assets 
involved in the transaction are specific - if just a restricted number of 
suppliers possess the necessary equipment to the accomplishment of the 
activity, his bargaining power increases -  affects negatively the price of the 
transaction;  (C) If the transaction is the recurrent type, that is, if the firm 
has to buy regularly large quantities of the product to the suppliers these 
will be able to demand better conditions. 
Governance implications 
The main governance implication of TCT is that the most efficient 
governance structure for organizing economic exchanges will depend on 
several characteristics of the transactions themselves. For instance, 
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nonspecific transactions of both occasional and recurrent contracting will be 
principally governed by the market. As assets became more and more 
specific, other forms of governance will be needed ranging from trilateral to 
unified governance structure (the firm) (Williamson, 1979, 1981, 1985). 
Williamson (1979, 1985) argued that asset specificity actually drives 
vertical integration, which contrasts with the traditional arguments of 
monopolistic market power. This has important policy implications because 
vertical integration is often viewed as being anti-competitive and subject to 
anti-trust litigation. When the transaction cost logic is applied and the 
concept of relative efficiency is introduced the benefits of vertical 
integration are more clearly understood (Williamson, 1979, 1985; Klein & 
Shelanski, 1994). 
EVOLUTION AND CRITICS TO THE TCT 
The evolution of TCT 
Although the above review of TCT relies primarily on Williamson’s work 
over the past few decades (Williamson & Ouchi, 1981; Williamson, 1979, 
1981, 1985, 1994), there are other notable scholars in this line of research 
exploring the very issue of why firms exist and do what they do. For 
example, over six decades ago Ronald Coase (1937), best known as the 
forefather of transaction cost theory, foresaw the transaction costs that 
arise when transactions are conducted through the market. The core insight 
awarding him the Nobel prize is that decision makers are situated at a 
boundary where using a pareto efficiency approach they have to constantly 
compare the transaction costs of using the market against those of 
managing exchanges internally. Internalizing the transactions optimizes the 
relative value of the exchange. In essence, the market price mechanism is 
replaced by fiat.  
It is worth noting that the value added from internalization is relative 
efficiency – that is the costs of conducting transactions through the market 
versus the relative costs of internalizing them (Jones, 1998). Hence, it is 
not saying that there are no transaction costs related to internalization but 
that they are relatively lower when compared to those of carrying the 
exchanges in the market. Moreover, the theory does not say that it is 
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always relatively more efficient to internalize transactions but rather that 
under certain conditions that will be the case. 
Notwithstanding it is not absolutely clear from Coase’s work what are 
the factors that affect the level of transactions inside a firm (Coase, 1988; 
Jones, 1998). Albeit Coase’s main purpose was to explain why economic 
activity was organized within firms, since the works of Williamson, the TCT 
has shifted away from Coase’s initial and more general treatment to 
concerns with issues such as appropriation, ownership, alignment of 
incentives, and self-interest. 
Williamson and Ouchi (1981: 367) state explicitly that the core 
methodological properties are (1) the transaction is the basic unit of 
analysis; (2) the human agents are subject to bounded rationality and self-
interest; (3) the critical dimensions for describing transactions are 
frequency, uncertainty, and transaction specific investments; (4) 
economizing on transaction costs is the principle factor that explains viable 
modes of contracting; and (5) assessing transaction cost differences is a 
comparative institutional exercise. 
Other authors have made significant contributions to our current 
understanding of TCT. Alchian and Demetsz (1972), for instance, examined 
team production, information costs, and economic organization – 
contrasting transaction and production costs. Meanwhile, they tended to 
disagree with the typical characterization of the hierarchy as a form of 
authority. For instance, they argued that the employee-employer 
relationship is not characterized by any more authority or fiat than any 
other type of relationship. The firm is a contractual structure with joint 
production, several input owners, one party who is common to all the 
contracts of the joint inputs, who has rights to renegotiate any input’s 
contract independently of contracts with other input owners, who holds the 
residual claim, and who has the right to sell his central contractual residual 
status (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Their work is influential to a larger 
degree because of their full explanation of the factors giving rise to different 
types of organizations. Spence (1975), on the internal economics of the 
organization, suggested that resource allocation processes that are 
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internalized are those which are not efficiently carried out in a decentralized 
manner (that is to say, where equilibria are inefficient). 
Due to the nature of many of the important constructs central to TCT, 
there is scarce empirical work effectively measuring these constructs. 
Because of the positivist view dominating much of the organizational 
sciences research, the quantification and measurements have been 
emphasized (Eccles, 1987). The TCT suffers the criticism of lack of 
sufficiently tested hypotheses. Nonetheless, Klein and Shelanski (1994) in a 
comprehensive review of the empirical research using TCT, found that the 
empirical research on vertical integration whose findings suggest that asset 
specificity and uncertainty are important drivers of vertical integration. 
Empirical work also found general support for TCT predictions for complex 
contracting, long-term commercial contracting, informal agreements, and 
franchising contracting (Klein & Shelanski, 1994). 
Critics on TCT 
Notwithstanding the tremendous impact of TCT of management 
research in the last two decades, TCT has been subjected to multiple 
criticisms. The TCT arguments have not remained unchallenged. Critics to 
TCT have relied on many facets and reasons albeit the relative merits of 
those critics is arguably. The most common criticism is that the central 
assumptions of TCT are flawed. For example, the assumption of 
opportunism has been criticized for ignoring the contextual grounding of 
human actions and therefore presenting an undersocialized view of human 
motivation and oversocialized view of institutional control (see, Granovetter, 
1985). Williamson responded to such criticisms by re-stating that in his 
model, opportunism or bounded rationality may differ from person to 
person much as personality or intelligence do, but when transaction costs 
change they do so because of changes in the environment, not in the 
person (Williamson, 1993a,b). Jones (1998) took an interactionist 
perspective rather than a dispositional one, to argue that opportunism may 
be seen as both a disposition and a psychological state produced by the 
interaction of personal and situational factors. Alchian and Woodward 
(1988) offered a refinement of the opportunism assumption in arguing that 
two types of opportunism should be more clearly identified - moral hazard 
 - 14 - 
and holdup - and that this distinction helps the theory better explain 
organization phenomena. 
Ghoshal and Moran (1996) attacked the validity of TCT on the grounds 
that the opportunism with guile is bad for practice. TCT is normative or 
prescriptive theory and if opportunism with guile assumption is taken 
seriously by managers there will be negative consequences for 
organizations. Application of TCT will increase the occurrence of 
opportunism rather than decreasing it. Ghoshal and Moran (1996) also 
criticized TCT for failing to point out how opportunism is reduced through 
alternative governance structures. Jones argued that the problem with TCT 
is Williamson’s description of the determinants of opportunism; and that 
there is a difference between the propensity to behave opportunistically (a 
behavioral trait) and the psychological state of opportunism. The same 
uncertainty condition that may lead some individuals to behave 
opportunistically it may lead others to trust. Under certain circumstances 
trust or cooperation may be the most rational and efficient self-interested 
behavior. The propensity to trust or opportunism as a state is a much more 
realistic assumption about human behavior given uncertainty (Jones, 1998). 
Albeit far less voiced, the criticisms on the assumption of bounded 
rationality and uncertainty still exist. Williamson’s model views people as 
being passive and defensive when confronted with the vagaries of an 
uncertain environment. Williamson treats environmental uncertainty as a 
threat that must be managed through the governance structure that allows 
managers to economize on transaction costs. Jones (1998) adopted a 
positive or entrepreneurial view and argued that bounded rationality and 
uncertainty are not problems to be managed and overcome, but rather are 
opportunities to be taken advantage of. Jones (1998: 42) states that “[t]he 
advantages of organizations over markets may lie in leveraging the human 
ability to take the initiative, to cooperate and to learn; it may also rely on 
exploiting the organization’s internalized purpose and diversity to enhance 
both learning and its use in creating innovations and purposive adaptation”.  
The TCT has been further criticized as only looking into two relative 
extremes methods of facilitating transactions that do not really exist. The 
critics argued that the market versus hierarchy dichotomy is somewhat 
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misleading since many transactions are actually carried out through a 
hybrid governance form (e.g., Hennart, 1993). Refuting, Williamson (1985) 
stated that the distributions of transactions would be a “bell-shaped” normal 
distribution if discrete transaction would  be located at the one extreme 
(market), highly centralized and hierarchical transactions on the other, and 
hybrid transactions (franchising, joint ventures, and other forms of 
nonstandard contracting) in between.  
A major critic to TCT is its tautological nature. Eccles (1987) claimed 
that Williamson failed to operationalize the measurements of transaction 
costs and there is a tautological flavor in his arguments. Eccles (1987: 604) 
argued that “ex-post arguments can usually be found that any given 
structure economized on transaction costs by simply defining these costs in 
a necessary way. When this can not be done, the argument can be made 
that the existing structure is a ‘mistake’ and will eventually be replaced by 
one that does economize on these costs”. The simple comparison of 
transaction costs under different governance structure is meaningless 
because the governance structure used to manage a transaction changes 
the nature of a transaction (Dow, 1987). Jones (1998) also noted that 
transaction costs appear on both the left and the right hand sides of the 
causality equation, which is one of the typical attributes of tautologies. 
Although Williamson distinguished ex ante costs (such as negotiation costs) 
from ex post costs (such as costs associated with contractual failures), it is 
hard to find any costs that are not transaction costs. Methodologically, case 
studies have been the prevalent means of assessing TCT because the main 
variables of interest to TCT researchers, specifically asset specificity, 
uncertainty, frequency - are difficult to measure consistently across firms 
and industries (Klein & Shelanski, 1994). 
Finally, TCT is criticized for failing to explain the alternative forms of 
organization and a lot of other organizational phenomena. However, TCT 
does not claim itself as panacea for everything; it only attempts to explain a 
portion of the organizational phenomena: why and under what conditions 
transactions are organized in certain ways (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1979). At best, TCT deals with relative efficiency question. Therefore, while 
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deserving a prominent place among the theories in organization, TCT can 
and should not be used exclusively to explain organization phenomena.  
 
BIBLIOMETRIC STUDY IN THE LEADING MANAGEMENT 
JOURNALS 
Method 
The method used in this paper follows the one described by Ramos-
Rodriguez and Ruiz Navarro (2004) in their research of intellectual structure 
change examining papers published in the Strategic Management Journal. 
This is a bibliometric study that aims at examining published articles and 
tries to identify patterns and trends using citation and co-citation analyses 
(White & Griffith, 1981; White & McCain, 1998). 
The citations analysis may use various types of documents (such as 
books, articles, reports etc) that we use and refer to when writing an 
academic research. The use of references means that some prior work is 
important for our own work. Hence, it is reasonable to suggest that articles 
that get more often cited are more influential for the discipline and the 
knowledge developed (Tahai & Meyer, 1999). 
The co-citation analysis examines possible groups or pairs of articles 
that are simultaneously cited in an article. So, articles that are cited 
together in another article, will probably have some common content or are 
based in common theory. Through this process we may identify groups of 
authors and themes, or theories, and how they may be related (see, White 
& Griffith, 1981; McCain, 1990; White & McCain, 1998). 
Procedure and sample 
The bibliometric study was performed in six academic leading journals 
top ranked in the most important rankings in the area of management 
(Wingers & Harzing, 2007): Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), 
Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ), Academy of Management Journal 
(AMJ), Management Science (MS), Organization Science (OS) and Strategic 
Management Journal (SMJ). These journal articles are available for 
download in the usual online databases subscribed by the universities. 
The sample used in this paper considers all articles found using the 
following keywords: Transactions Cost Theory, TCT, Transactions Cost 
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Economics and TCE. These keywords were searched using the option ‘topic’ 
that includes the title of the articles, the abstracts, the keywords provided 
by the authors and the keywords created (KeyWords Plus). We analyzed 
16,179 articles published in the entire available online database of the 
selected journals (see Table 1). We identified 217 TCT-related articles for 
the citation and co-citation study. We retrieved all important bibliometric 
information from the articles, namely: journal, title, authors, vol. issue, 
year, abstract and all the references used in each of the 217 articles. 
 
Table 1. TCT articles in the journals selected 
Journal Period Total of articles 
TCT 
articles 
% in 
the 
journal 
% of 
TCT 
Academy of Management Review 86/09 1,968 32 1.63 14.75 
Administrative Science Quarterly 72/07 3,338 12 0.36 5.53 
Academy of Management Journal  93/09 2,820 23 0.82 10.60 
Management Science 91/08 5,432 26 0.48 11.98 
Organization Science 92/09 869 42 4.83 19.35 
Strategic Management Journal 88/09 1,752 82 4.68 37.79 
Total 16,179 217 1.34 100.00 
 
Data was organized with the software Bibexcel1 which permits us to 
create the citations descriptive analysis and co-citation matrixes. The matrix 
was the input for the scaloning multidimensional multivariate analysis 
(EMD), with Microsoft Excel 2007 and Ucinet 6 software. Figure 1 
summarizes the method used, similar to Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro 
(2004). 
 
Figure 1. Citation and co-citation method 
                                               
1 Available at  http://www.umu.se/inforsk/Bibexcel 
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Source: Adapted from Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro (2004). 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the top 20 most cited articles related to the TCT. These 
articles were used to build the map presented in Figure 2, that shows the 
co-citation relationship. 
 
Table 2. Top 20 most cited articles 
# 
citations References 
% 
citation 
in 217 
articles 
150 
Williamson, O. 1985. The economic institutions of 
capitalism: Firms, markets, relational 
contracting. New York: Free Press. 69.12 
108 
Williamson, O. 1975. Markets and hierarchies, 
analysis and antitrust implications: A study in 
the economics of internal organization. New 
York: Free Press. 49.77 
77 
Williamson, O. 1991. Comparative economic 
organization: The analysis of discrete structural 
alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly , 
36: 269-296 35.48 
60 
Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social 
structure: The problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 3: 481-510. 27.65 
58 
Klein, B., Crawford, R. & Alchian, A. 1978. Vertical 
integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive 
contracting process. Journal of Law and 26.73 
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Economics, 21: 297-326.  
54 
Gulati, R. (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The 
implications of repeated ties for contractual choice 
in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 
38 (1): 85–112. 24.88 
54 
Coase, R. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica, 
4: 386-405. 24.88 
51 
Nelson, R. & Winter, S. 1982. An evolutionary 
theory of economic change. Cambridge, MA, 
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The co-citation map is shown in figure 2 where the lines connecting 
authors reflect the co-citations. This graphical analysis clearly illustrates the 
structure of intellectual union between authors. It is apparent that three of 
Oliver Williamson’s works - Williamson, 1975, 1981 and 1985 - are far more 
cited than other. 
 
Figure 2. Co-citation map of the 20 most cited articles 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we sought to review the transaction costs theory albeit 
parsimoniously, since a thorough review may be found elsewhere, and 
examine links between authors and theories. This endeavor was carried out 
examining the papers published in top management journals and using 
citation and co-citation analysis. In this manner we complement existing 
research, both theoretical and empirical as well as other works that aim at 
assessing for instance how the extant research on transactions costs has 
been empirical (Macher & Richman, 2008). 
According to the transaction costs theory, the transaction costs 
emerge because there are limits to human cognition. In sum, although we 
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expect people to behave rationally we need to incorporate a bounded 
rationally constraint in that expectation due namely to the difficulties in 
gathering and processing information that hinder on how individuals 
actually behave. The extant research has agreed on three main sources of 
transaction costs. The limited capacity of individuals to plan for the future 
given the complexity and pace of change of the environment and lack of 
knowledge. Uncertainty and incomplete contracts. Moreover, one needs to 
attend to the difficulties in enforcing the contracts. As such, the parties to a 
transaction are exposed to opportunistic behaviors. To protect, or prevent, 
those behaviors, firms seek the best institutional arrangement to minimize 
the costs involved in a transaction. The outcome is that firms will seek to 
select from the organizational menu, the organizational form that is best 
suited to a specific transaction. In some instances, firms will prefer to carry 
out the transactions internally and in other instances they will prefer to rely 
on the markets. It is important to note that the higher the asset specific 
investments required, the more important it will be for firms to control and 
coordinate the transaction and the higher the a priori tendency to govern 
that transaction. To conclude, transaction costs theory as been often 
applied to studies on the boundaries of the firm discussing the rationale for 
deciding on such an essential matter as to make or to buy. 
Figure 2 and Table 2 may indicate some predominant discussions 
around or involving the TCT. Observing the set of papers in table 2 we 
identify papers on such disparate issues as strategic alliances and networks 
(Ring & Van De Ven, 1992; Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Dyer & Singh, 
1998), and social networks (Granovetter, 1985), transaction costs theory 
per se (Coase, 1937; Walker & Weber, 1984; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 
1991), resource based view (Barney, 1991), industrial organization (Porter, 
1980), organization theory broadly captured (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Granovetter, 1985) and so forth. It 
is clear nonetheless, that at least some of the most cited papers are seminal 
papers on the TCT, such as Williamson’s (1975, 1985, 1991), Coase’s 
(1937) and Alchian, A. & Demsetz (1972), 
The most cited works are Williamson’s (1975) paper on ‘Markets and 
hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications’ and his 1985 book on ‘The 
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economic institutions of capitalism’. Williamson’s (1991) presents the 
effects of uncertainty on the organization of production. The work of Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian (1978) is also considered a seminal work on TCT, 
looking at the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior as a cost 
of using the market system. Coase (1937) is often cited as the basis for the 
TCT, as well as Alchian & Demsetz’s (1972) paper on the economic 
organizations. It is important to note that some of these papers may be 
cited not only for signaling purposes but also for their critic to the theory 
itself. In some instances, the critic is based on the need to consider 
dynamic aspects as a possibility to reduce transaction costs (Teece, 1990). 
That is perhaps the insight in Kogut & Zander (1992). Nonetheless, it is 
worth pointing out that scientific knowledge evolves normally (Khun, 1970) 
and theoretical progress needs to build on previous work, often contrasting, 
criticizing or complementing received knowledge. 
As a contribution to Williamson (1985), Parkhe (1993) added that 
asset specificity makes exchange partners more committed to the 
relationships since the related idiosyncratic investments are likely to lose 
their value upon transfer. The TCT is a core theory in all discussions and 
theorizing on the boundaries of firms and governance arrangements. As 
such it will show up in papers dealing with corporate strategy such as 
vertical integration decisions, horizontal and vertical diversification, 
acquisitions, and an array of hybrid governance forms that may be 
suggested, such as network forms. The TCT is further employed in studies 
on the strategic decisions involving the dichotomy make or buy (later 
extended to make, buy or ally) and considering production costs, as 
proposed by Walker & Weber (1984). Indeed, the make or buy decisions are 
a central concern for instance in the Resource Based View (Barney, 1991) 
either explicitly or implicitly as firms need to know which resources held are 
truly strategic and which they need to develop to better compete in the 
future. That may entail, for example, decisions on the degree of vertical 
integration or the extent of firm participation in the value chain (Ferreira & 
Serra, 2010; Monteverde & Teece, 1982). 
A well cited article is Granovetter (1985) where he puts forward the 
concept of embeddedness based on the idea that the relations between 
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individuals are embedded in social networks and can hardly be thought of in 
an abstract, impersonal market. Granovetter’s criticisms to the TCT were 
thus founded in the need to include social and cultural factors when 
examining organization level phenomena. Specifically one may concur that 
social relations between individuals (or firms) may act to, for instance, 
reduce transactions costs (Granovetter, 1985). In a complementary view 
Zajac & Olsen (1993) argue that it is important to go beyond an analysis of 
costs, in particular concerns over cost minimization, and truly evaluate the 
value creation of the transactions.  
We observe the co-citation of TCT related works with research on 
networks, alliances and other hybrid forms of governance. Gulati’s (1995) 
research on strategic alliances criticizes TCT for erroneously treating each 
transaction independently in inter-firm alliances and for ignoring that by 
engaging in repeated alliances with the same partners, inter-firms trust may 
emerge diminishing potential opportunistic behaviors and transaction costs. 
The work of Ring & Van De Ven (1992) on structuring collaborative 
relationships and Parkhe’s (1993) on collaborative strategies proceed in a 
similar vein, highlighting the benefits of stable, trustworthy relationships as 
transaction cost minimizers. Dyer & Singh (1998) discusse buyer-supplier 
relationships considering networks and alliances and resorting to arguments 
based on different theoretical streams such as the resource-based view, 
industrial organizational and transaction costs. Albeit in the realms of 
organization theory, Thompson’s (1967) seminal work on coordination 
mechanisms and interdependence of organizations has straightforward 
value for this discussion. 
Much of the research offers conflicting and complementing arguments, 
resorting to different theories in explaining organizational phenomena. The 
Resource-based view of the firm, encompasses the work of several scholars, 
such as Barney (1991), who has focused on the relative merits of 
opportunism versus knowledge coordination as the appropriate theoretical 
basis for a theory of the firm (see also Conner & Prahalad, 1996). It seems 
reasonable to restate Madhok’s (2002) suggestion that TCT scholars have 
focused mainly on the role of efficient governance in explaining firms as 
institutions for organizing economic activity. Conversely, the researchers 
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taking a RBV have tended to emphasize the role of competitive advantage 
(although Coase 1937 anticipated many of the critical issues that RBV 
scholars are concerned with today, including the central question of 
performance differences among firms) and how firms may accumulate 
capabilities and learn (Nelson & Winter, 1982). While TCT has undoubtedly 
made important contributions to strategic management theory, particularly 
in the realm of economic organization, it is nevertheless only a partial 
solution since it provides, at best, a tenuous link with competitive 
advantage, arguably the key concern for strategy. According to Madhok 
(2002) the theory of the firm (TCT) and the theory of performance 
differences between firms (RBV) should be treated as complementary. 
The TCT is further cited along research on the Resource Dependency 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The contrast is evident in that the latter 
asserts that organizations are dependent on the external environment for 
vital resources and that the main goals of the firms are to obtain valuable 
resources that are needed to achieve performance goals. The Resource 
Dependency theory focuses on inter-organization relationships and the unit 
of analysis is a single organization. In contrast, the TCT treats the 
transaction as the basic unit and governance structures are selected for 
given transactions. On the other hand, TCT scholars argued that Resource 
Dependency theory unduly ignored transaction costs and efficiency concerns 
(Williamson & Ouchi, 1981). 
Porter’s (1980) work is usually used together with TCT in comparing 
the relative merits of different theories. While we may position Porter in the 
industrial organization group, where the focus is largely on the external 
environment, be it the industry or the nation (as in his 1990 work on the 
competitive advantage of nations), the contrast to the focus on the 
transactions that is postulated by the TCT is clear. In any instance, there is 
not an evident path linking both streams of research beyond the usual 
contrasting arguments that characterizes the scholarly debate. 
Our presentation on the TCT and the links to other scholars and works 
is useful in envisioning the current state of the art in the discipline and in 
understanding how theories and concepts are interwined in either 
contrasting or complementary arguments. It would, nonetheless, be 
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interesting to delve deeper into the frequency of such co-citations to 
understand better how the TCT is integrated with other organizational 
theories. 
The conflicting assumptions or/and arguments between theories may 
lead to a more constructive understanding of what is also a social 
phenomena: firms and individuals interact when they meet in the market. It 
seems that the TCT’s assumptions need to be further refined as suggested 
by Jones (1998) and Ghoshal and Moran (1996) for clearer empirical tests 
to be performed. Perhaps a possible avenue for additional research is 
examining the value optimization rather than simply transaction cost 
minimization in inter-firm exchanges. Furthermore, several scholars (e.g., 
Jones, 1998; Gulati, 1995, and others) presented the concept of inter-firm 
trust that warrants additional research. Lastly, more empirical studies are 
expected utilizing all relevant methodologies (Klein & Shelanski, 1994), on 
the basis of further clarification on TCT constructs (Williamson, 1994). 
To conclude, it is undeniable the merit of the TCT for examining firms’ 
choices, namely those regarding where to set the boundaries of the firms. 
Or, as some scholars put it, choices regarding what they do and whet they 
do not. But TCT is “not a flawed transplant from economics but a valuable 
addition and refinement to organizational theory that has taken the analysis 
of organizational issues and the theory of the firm to a new level of 
sophistication” (Jones, 1998: 5). We observed that the influence of TCT is 
enormous in the management disciplines and albeit we see that other 
concepts and views are emerging – such as the resource-, knowledge-, 
capabilities-based view - the TCT will likely maintain its influence in the 
discipline. 
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